Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina by Juan Pablo Nicolini et al.









Inter-American Development Bank 
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo 
Latin American Research Network 
Red de Centros de Investigación 
Research Network Working paper #R-467 
 
 
Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National 
Governments And the Bailout Problem: 











*Universidad Torcuato di Tella 
**Universidad Nacional de la Plata 
***Secretaría de Programación Económica y Regional, 
Ministerio de Economía 
§ Universidad de San Andrés and Centro de Estudios 







 Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the  
Inter-American Development Bank  
Felipe Herrera Library 
 
 
Decentralization, fiscal discipline in sub-national governments, and the bailout problem : the 
case of Argentina / by Juan Pablo Nicolini … [et al.]. 
 
p. cm.   (Research Network Working papers ; R-467) 
Includes bibliographical references. 
 
1.  Intergovernmental fiscal relations--Argentina.   2. Central-local government relations--
Argentina.  3. Decentralization in government--Argentina.   I.  Nicolini, Juan Pablo.   II. Inter-
American Development Bank. Research  Dept.    III. Series.   
 





















Inter-American Development Bank 
1300 New York Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20577 
 
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its behalf. 
 
The Research Department (RES) produces the Latin American Economic Policies Newsletter, as 
well as working papers and books, on diverse economic issues. To obtain a complete list of RES 
publications, and read or download them please visit our web site at: http://www.iadb.org/res 
  2Abstract 
 
This paper examines the determinants of fiscal performance of sub-national 
governments in Argentina.  This will be done through analysis and examination of 
the overall regime of incentives, through an analysis of salient episodes of 
“bailout” and through cross-sectional empirical analysis. The bailout episodes to 
be analyzed will include mostly those that occurred in the relationship between 
the national and provincial governments. Of primary interest will be the process 
that caused the crises and how both the provinces and the federal government 
reacted, with an emphasis on the incentives and constraints each faced. The paper 
will also try to explain the actual form that the bailout takes. The empirical 
analysis will emphasize those determinants of bailout related to the institutional 
design of intergovernmental fiscal institutions. Thus, the study will have direct 
implications regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the current institutional 
framework in generating sound fiscal behavior by the different levels of 
government.  
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  4 
1. Introduction   
 
Argentina is a democratic country with a federal system and a tradition since pre-independence 
times of strong provincial governments and politics.  The country is relatively well endowed, 
both in terms of natural and human resources, and has always been considered a candidate for 
strong, sustained growth and development. Nevertheless, this potential gone largely unrealized 
due to a very peculiar politico-economic history.  That history has been, in part, related to 
conflict over the distribution of fiscal resources, with the different political jurisdictions as key 
actors. In this respect, and within the context of the various reforms already taken in other areas, 
the reform of the country’s federal fiscal (and political) institutions is likely to be a key 
determinant of whether Argentina will be able to embark on a sustained path of economic and 
social development.  
Argentina is divided into 24 autonomous political jurisdictions consisting of 23 provinces 
and the City of Buenos Aires. With approximately 50 percent of total public spending occurring 
at the sub-national level, it is the most decentralized country in Latin America.  At the same time, 
the most important taxes are collected at the national level, which implies a significant degree of 
vertical imbalance.  
In Argentina’s federal system, the political autonomy of sub-national governments is 
quite high.  Furthermore, provincial politics is an important building block of national politics, 
due to the nature of the electoral system (Jones, 1995 and 1997). Thus, a high degree of fiscal 
decentralization (at least on the expenditure side) coupled with high institutional and political 
autonomy and heterogeneity makes Argentina a very appealing case in which to study the 
interplay of institutional and political factors in the working of federal finances. 
Provincial fiscal decisions have always had a significant impact on overall public sector 
finances. In the 1980s the provinces were responsible for a considerable part of the consolidated 
public sector deficit.  Over the last decade a number of measures have been taken to reduce sub-
national governments’ latitude for engaging in unsustainable fiscal behavior. Yet, the situation is 
far from being resolved, and these governments’ future performance remains crucial for the 
consolidation of macroeconomic stability. 
The indicated high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance has been addressed with a 
complicated system of intergovernmental transfers, among which the most important is the tax-
sharing regime (Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos). As will be discussed below, the 
  5underlying legal framework of the “coparticipation” system has been repeatedly altered, and it 
has been the source of numerous conflicts.  These periodic modifications have led to the current 
situation in which the whole system has reached a high level of complexity. As many observers 
have shown, this intricate scheme (christened the “fiscal labyrinth”) does not correspond with 
any economic criteria, and it provides all sorts of perverse incentives for the provincial leaders to 
overexploit the common pool of national taxation. One of the implications is that, oftentimes, 
provincial authorities behave as if they did not face a hard budget constraint, anticipating “ex-
post” assistance from national sources. 
The aim of this study is to look into the determinants of fiscal performance of sub-
national governments in Argentina.  This will be done through analysis and examination of the 
overall regime of incentives, through an analysis of salient episodes of “bailout” and through 
cross-sectional empirical analysis. 
The bailout episodes to be analyzed will include mostly those that occurred in the 
relationship between the national and provincial governments.
1 Of primary interest will be the 
process that caused the crises and how both the provinces and the federal government reacted, 
with an emphasis on the incentives and constraints each faced. The paper will also try to explain 
the actual form that the bailout takes. Transfers, as mentioned above, are just one form; others 
include loans, anticipation of taxes, guarantees, transfers of expenditure responsibilities, and 
assumption of liabilities of the sub-national government. 
The empirical analysis will emphasize those determinants of bailout related to the 
institutional design of intergovernmental fiscal institutions. Thus, the study will have direct 
implications regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the current institutional framework in 
generating sound fiscal behavior by the different levels of government.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some definitions and 
the institutional context that has shaped the working of fiscal federalism in Argentina. Section 3 
describes the bailout episodes to be investigated. Section 4 presents some general conclusions 
and ideas for future research. 
 
                                                           
1 The usage in Argentina, followed throughout this paper, is to refer to the federal government as “the national 
government.” 
  62. Bailout: Some Definitions and the Institutional Features of Fiscal 
Federalism in Argentina 
 
Before a detailed discussion of bailout episodes begins, it is useful to make explicit what is 
meant by bailout and its possible determinants. Also, an understating of the bailout episodes will 
be enhanced by the analysis of some basic features of the working of fiscal federalism in 
Argentina which will be common to all the episodes to be analyzed in Section 3.  
 
2.1 Bailout: Definition and Determinants 
 
Bailouts are situations where a federal government, by assuming an obligation of a sub-national 
government, deviates from an explicit or implicit ex-ante rule, taking an ex-post action that was 
not contractually pre-established. If this ex-post incentive to deviate is anticipated by the sub-
national government, the latter would be expected to engage in opportunistic behavior.  Such 
behavior will be reflected in unsustainable fiscal behavior that increases the jurisdiction’s 
exposure to a crisis in the event of an exogenous shock. Two aspects of this definition of bailout 
deserve emphasis: first, deviation from a rule, and second, opportunistic behavior.  
A case may occur in which there is a deviation from a rule without opportunistic 
behavior—for example, the case in which a provincial obligation (i.e., debt) with the central 
government is rescheduled or condoned because of an exogenous event such as a natural 
disaster.  This case can be interpreted as an optimal response by the system given the 
impossibility of writing down fully contingent contracts. This episode is in some sense part of 
the implicit contract established among the various levels of governments; it is efficient and it 
cannot be interpreted as a bailout.  
At the other end of the spectrum are cases in which sub-national governments behave 
opportunistically but as a consequence of an ex-ante-established rule that distorts its incentives 
on a permanent basis. An example of such a rule is a regime of transfers that distributes 
resources taking into account the number of public employees in each jurisdiction. This cannot 
be considered a bailout, as irresponsible fiscal behavior is part of the current system of rules 
governing the relationship among the various levels of governments. 
Of course, between these two extremes there may be situations where the identification of 
bailouts is not as clear-cut. This, in fact, occurs in many real-world cases, as information 
problems make it impossible to identify where opportunistic behavior is involved. This is 
  7because sub-national actions, such as tax effort, cannot be directly observed in many 
circumstances, which in turn makes it difficult to distinguish readily between responses to 
exogenous events and instances of fiscal misconduct. In fact, this difficulty is part of the problem 
and explains why in practice bailouts occur. In the episodes described in Section 3 these issues 
will have some importance. 
The above analysis provides a definition of bailout that will be applied to the cases in the 
next section. A prior regarding the determinants of bailout is based on the discussion above, 
though with extensions relevant to the case of Argentina. 
One key factor causing the federal government’s ex-post incentives to deviate from those 
ex-ante is the adjustment cost faced by the lower government in times of distress. In a situation 
where the central government cares about the welfare of the population, this factor will affect the 
authorities’ incentives to intervene. These adjustment costs will, in turn, depend on the degree of 
flexibility that the sub-national government has to change taxes and/or expenditures.  As 
suggested by Eichengreen and Von Hagen (1996), a key explanatory variable in this respect is 
the degree of autonomy that jurisdictions have to set and change tax rates or create taxes, as well 
as the degree of vertical imbalance or the proportion of expenditures financed out of local 
revenues.  
Externalities represent another factor affecting the ex-post incentives of the federal 
government to intervene. Wildasin (1997) emphasizes the negative externalities that a fiscal 
crisis in one jurisdiction can cause in others. For example, if a province fails to pay back in time 
a debt obligation in the international market, it may induce an increase in the cost of 
indebtedness to the rest of the country. This externality argument lead to a “too big to fail” 
prediction where a jurisdiction’s likelihood of being bailed out is determined by its size, as this 
will relate to the magnitude of the externality. This hypothesis will be examined in the next 
section, especially in an episode related to the Province of Cordoba. 
Another factor that affects the ex-post incentives of the federal government is the 
political cost/benefit the government receives by intervening at the sub-national level. In this 
regard, election times could make a federal government more sensitive to pressures from local 
jurisdiction especially when the jurisdiction is important in terms of votes. The political costs 
that the federal government may endure because of failing to help the jurisdiction will also 
depend on whether the fiscal problems could in part be associated with actions taken by the 
  8central authorities. In these situations the federal government’s incentives to intervene are 
expected to be greater. One such occurs when the federal government is actually in charge of 
sub-national (provincial) affairs because of a political and institutional federal intervention. 
Other situations include those in which the jurisdiction’s fiscal problems are in part a 
consequence of national policy. In this sense some of the episodes analyzed below have occurred 
in the context of policy changes originating at the national level (i.e., the reform of the pension 
system), or shocks that affected the economy as a whole (the crises generated in 1985 by the 
Mexican devaluation). It can thus be argued that the local economy’s ability to adjust to such 
shocks depends on National economic policy. 
Finally, within the political economy considerations, it is important to study how the 
central authorities’ incentives are affected by whether sub-national authorities belong to the same 
party as the federal government. In general, the effect of this variable could go either way 
depending on whether party discipline exists. Thus, in the case where there is a high degree of 
party discipline, the federal government would not need to “buy” that support (votes) from 
jurisdictions run by its own party in order to obtain support for its initiatives. Instead, the federal 
government may need to do so with jurisdictions run by other political parties. There is some 
evidence for Argentina of a relatively high level of party discipline (see Jones, 1997). In 
addition, Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (1999) found that party discipline has provided a 
check on expansive fiscal policies at the provincial level. The role of this political variable, 
however, has not been investigated in bailout events, and the next section will attempt to do, 
particularly in regard to National Treasury Contributions (NTCs). 
Whether the federal government’s ex-post incentives to intervene will actually precipitate 
a bailout depends on institutional factors that make the federal government more or less sensitive 
to those ex-post pressures. It also depends on the presence of rules at the local level that, given 
the set of incentives facing the federal government, causes the local jurisdiction to take more or 
less advantage of these opportunities.  
Some federal institutions, even though not explicitly designed to address 
intergovernmental relations, can operate as an effective brake to the ex-post accommodation of 
local jurisdictions’ financial needs. Such institutions include fiscal rules on debts or deficits, 
restrictions on monetary financing, independent central banks, and currency-board arrangements. 
  9As will be seen in the next section, this has been a key factor in the case of Argentina after the 
convertibility plan was launched.  
Also, of course, provincial-level institutions will reduce (or exacerbate) the incentives for 
local authorities to misbehave. These institutions include balanced-budget laws at the local level 
(very common in other countries such as the USA), borrowing limits, and independent audit 
agencies.
2 The next section investigates whether any of these institutional variables has exerted a 
significant effect in the provinces that have experienced bailouts. 
 
2.2 Institutional Features of the Working of Fiscal Federalism in Argentina 
 
Certain basic institutional features of the working of fiscal federalism in Argentina bear direct 
implications for the analysis of bailouts and will play a key role in some of the episodes 
presented in Section 3. Thus, this sub-section reviews these features, describing the division of 
expenditure and tax responsibilities between the national and provincial jurisdictions and 
indicating the resulting level of fiscal vertical imbalance. The sub-section also briefly analyzes 
how this vertical imbalance has been addressed through intergovernmental transfers.  In addition, 
this sub-section briefly describes some provincial fiscal institutions, such as the existence of 
formal limits for provincial borrowing, the regulation of provincial transfers going to 
municipalities, the use of federal transfers as guarantees in provincial loans operations and the 
legal status of provincial state banks.     
As noted above, Argentina is one of the most decentralized countries in Latin America in 
terms of public spending, with approximately 50 percent of the total occurring at the sub-national 
level (Inter-American Development Bank, 1997).
3  The revenue side presents the inverse picture, 
with most important taxes collected at the national level. This leads to a high degree of vertical 
fiscal imbalance. From 1985 to 1995, an average of 65 percent of provincial expenditures were 
financed through transfers from a common pool of national taxes, with only 35 percent financed 
from direct own-provincial revenues. As Figure 1 shows, there is a high variation around this 35 
percent (weighted) average.
4  Ten provinces finance less than 15 percent (and sixteen provinces 
less than 20 percent) of their spending with their own resources. Most of the transfers coming 
                                                           
2 Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (1999) test the effect of these institutional features on provincial expenditures. 
3 If the pension system is excluded, provincial and municipal spending in 1997 was twice as large as spending by the 
federal government (Piffano, 1998).  
  10from the federal government are carried out on behalf of a delegation of tax authority from the 
provinces. As a consequence the use of 71 percent of the transfers is left to the discretion of 
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Figure 1: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance,  1997
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 The simple average is just 23 percent, the difference being explained by the fact that the larger provinces (like 
Buenos Aires) tend to have smaller imbalances. 
  11The Argentine Constitution establishes that the federal government will use tariffs on 
foreign trade to finance its expenditures, while provinces will finance themselves through taxes 
on the production and consumption of specific goods. Over time, however, for economic and 
political reasons, the national government became the main agent responsible for the collection 
of most taxes at the provincial level.  The process by which these taxes, once collected, are then 
re-allocated to the provinces has been the source of numerous conflicts and modifications (see 
Porto and Sanguinetti, 1993).  Argentina’s first national tax-sharing agreement (“Ley de 
Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos”) dates from 1935,
5 and new tax laws have periodically 
been written to regulate this distribution.  The current law, passed in 1988, establishes that the 
federal government retains 42 percent of these taxes, while 57 percent is distributed among the 
provinces. The remaining 1 percent set aside “to finance unforeseen crises in the provinces.”
6 
The law also establishes the percentages of the secondary distribution. Several supplementary 
laws regulate the distribution and destination of some specific taxes that finance a set of 
predetermined activities.  
Some of the main features of the 1988 coparticipation scheme prevail today, even though 
there have been numerous changes and adjustments.  One of the main changes was to establish 
“precoparticipations,” that is, to redirect parts of the tax revenue from the tax-sharing pool 
towards other purposes. (For instance, in 1992 and 1993 the national government was able to 
reduce the amount to be shared with the provinces by 15 percent in order to finance the growing 
social security deficits.)  Another important change was to provide some fixed-sum transfers and 
a minimum transfer guarantee to the provinces. Another factor was the decentralization of many 
educational and health services since 1992.  This was to be financed by a transfer equivalent to 
the estimated cost of the services transferred.  According to the World Bank (1996), the tax- 
sharing system has reached a high degree of complexity that does not correspond to any 
economic criteria.  
The high degree of vertical imbalance, as well as the lack of transparency and 
discretionary character of some of the transfers going to provinces, have had visible 
consequences for the fiscal behavior of some jurisdictions. In particular, the system has 
                                                           
5 These laws define the share of specified taxes to be transferred from the central government to the provinces 
(“primary distribution”) and the way in which these funds are to be allocated among the provinces (“secondary 
distribution”). 
  12generated a moral hazard problem that undermines the incentives of lower units to behave in 
fiscally responsible ways.  Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (1997 and 1999) provide (indirect) 
empirical evidence on these “common pool” incentive effects induced by the coparticipation 
regime.  They show: (1) that the larger provinces “internalize” more the federal tax cost of their 
spending; (2) that the provinces that are more favored by the “secondary coparticipation” 
(beyond the mere devolution of the taxes collected by the national government in the province) 
are more inclined to fiscal profligacy; and (3) that the national executive is able to discipline 
governors from the same party into internalizing some of these costs.
7   
Within Argentina’s federal structure all levels of government are generally permitted to 
borrow both domestically and abroad. During the 1980s both levels of government borrowed 
extensively, reflecting the weak fiscal management of the period.  In addition, both accumulated 
sizable arrears on wages and pensions, payments to suppliers, and debt service.
8 In many 
provinces, the provincial Constitution imposes some restrictions on the borrowing ability of the 
government (Sanguinetti and Tommasi, 1997). In some jurisdictions an extraordinary legislative 
majority is required to approve new debt, and further restrictions are imposed on the level of 
indebtedness and on the use of debt. Nevertheless, in most provinces, these restrictions are very 
mild, and when they specify quantitative limitations they are rarely binding. It is not surprising, 
then, to find that borrowing limits had no significant effect on the fiscal behavior of provinces 
(Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi, 1999). 
The situation was further complicated by the legal status of provincial state banks, which 
in most provinces were very dependent on the provincial executive; in practice they served as 
captive sources of financing.  In this sense, the provincial government banks were considered to 
be akin to the central bank of each province: they provided funds to the provincial governments 
upon demand and, in turn, received rediscounts from the Central Bank of Argentina.
9  Given 
their portfolio of bad assets (resulting to a significant extent from lending to provincial 
governments), provincial banks were among the prime candidates for restructuring and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 In practice, these funds, called National Treasury Contributions (NTCs), are distributed in a discretionary way by 
the National Executive, through the Ministry of the Interior (the most “political” of ministries). 
7 Also, in a situation of large vertical fiscal imbalances (as well as other considerations to be discuseed below), the 
workings of local democracy do not induce prudent fiscal behavior by local authorities.  Saront (1998) shows that 
(as in the United, according to Peltzman 1992) voters penalize federal spending but (unlike the US case) they 
reward local spending. 
8 During the 1990s the federal government tried to consolidate those arrears; the clearance operation added up to a 
total of 9 percent of 1995 GDP. 
  13consolidation, a process that was accelerated after the 1995 Tequila crises induced a run on most 
provincial financial institutions.  As of mid-1998, only six provincial banks remained in the 
hands of the provincial public sectors. 
A key change in the economic context that has had noticeable effects in the behavior of 
provincial (and of course national) finances has been the strong commitment to inflation 
stabilization of the federal government since 1991. By establishing a currency board 
arrangement, the Convertibility Law of March 1991 ended inflationary Central Bank financing 
of public sector deficits. Before this period the federal government was able to accommodate 
expansion in provincial expenditures through inflationary financing. It did this through two 
channels. The first consisted of loans from the Central Bank made to provincial banks. The 
second involved increasing federal government outlays, in turn motivated by increasing transfers 
to provincial jurisdictions, which had to be financed by monetary expansion.   
It might be expected that the hardening of the central government’s budget constraint 
brought about by the convertibility law would reduce provincial governments’ incentives to 
misbehave, as they would anticipate that federal authorities face strong restrictions to ex-post 
accommodate provincial fiscal deficits. Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (1999) empirically 
investigated this hypothesis and found some evidence that after convertibility provincial finances 
were indeed on average less expansive. In particular, they found a strong positive effect on 
provincial revenues per capita and a negative (though more modest) effect on provincial 
expenditures.  
Still, while recent changes have reduced the central authorities’ leeway for carrying out 
extraordinary financing operations, as the next section will discuss, they have not been sufficient 
to eliminate them completely. As indicated above, there are almost no formal limitations on 
domestic currency borrowing operations, and provincial governments have continued the 
practice of pledging future coparticipation receipts as collateral for borrowing from commercial 
banks.  In addition, they have sometimes developed alternative sources of financing. For 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 For example, those rediscounts amounted to over 2 percent of annual provincial spending during 1983-1990. 
  143.  Bailout Episodes  
This section identifies and analyzes several bailout episodes, concentrating on those occurring at 
the federal-provincial level.
10  The episodes presented below are in general not differentiated by 
the province involved, or when the bailout occurred, but rather on the type of instrument or 
institutional set-up used to help the jurisdiction. If money is viewed as fungible (both 
economically and politically), however, the program or institutional set-up of each particular 
bailout should matter less than the total amount of money transferred from the center to a given 
jurisdiction in any particular period. Still, given the uncertainty or lack of information regarding 
the ultimate motives that guide fiscal decision of both federal and provincial authorities, it is 
useful to concentrate on the nature of the mechanisms whereby funds are transferred across 
jurisdictions; this focus implicitly reveal the incentives that were critical in motivating federal 
intervention.  Furthermore, money is not totally fungible (especially in political terms),
11 so that 
to a certain extent the classification of episodes by type of institutional set-up used to help a 
given jurisdictions will not undermine the analysis. 
  
3.1 The Nationalization of the Provincial Pension Systems 
 
One of the main sources of deficits in provincial finances was the state provincial pension 
system. These systems generated large deficits due to poor mechanisms for collecting revenues 
and to generous benefit payments. Between 1994 and 1996 the National government took direct 
responsibility for the operation of the provincial pension systems in eleven jurisdictions, merging 
them with the national system.
12 As a consequence, the national government had to assume a 
significant fiscal cost given the disequilibria present in those regimes. The provincial pension 
systems are described below, and subsequently analyzed is the economic and institutional 
                                                           
10 While this paper concentrates on “bailouts” to subnational governments, in Argentina other entities have also 
received sizable bailouts. The most recent case is the bailout extended to Unión Obrera Metalúrgica.  The Steel 
Workers Union has been very important in the history of Peronism and its leader, Lorenzo Miguel, had been 
opposed to President Menem’s shift towards free-market policies; yet, in an act of reconciliation, the National 
Government assumed the union’s obligations undertaken prior to July 31, 1989; these included arrears with 
suppliers amounting to $65 million.  The administrative decision was taken by the Jefatura de Gabinete. A similar 
case is the bailout to the National Institute of Social Services for the Elderly (INSSJyP) in 1997.  Through decree 
197/97 the Nation assumes all its liabilities.  The decree does not specify the amount, although it establishes that 
those debts will be serviced through a budget allocation that cannot exceed $100 million per year.  Also, the 
National Government provided the Institute $220,000 loan through the National Health Insurance Administration 
(ANSSAL). 
11 See, for instance Iaryckzower, Saiegh and Tommasi (1999) and Coate and Morris (1995). 
12 For a historical analysis of the whole pension system in Argentina, see Fiscella (1995). 
  15context within which the national government took responsibility for provincial social security. 
The subsection closes with a discussion of how the total costs, including those of political nature, 
were shared among the various actors and the extent to which the transfer of local government 
expenditures responsibility to the national authorities constituted a bailout.  
 
The Main Characteristics of the Provincial Pensions Systems 
  
Up to 1994 all provinces administered their own system of social security for provincial and 
municipal public workers, and the personnel of provincial public companies, provincial banks 
and other decentralized organisms. In some jurisdictions there were also special regimes for 
housewives (Catamarca, Entre Rios and La Rioja) and “pensiones graciables” in Buenos Aires 
and La Rioja.
13  
These provincial regimes were organized as pay-as-you-go systems with state guarantees 
(like the National regime). Thus, pension payments were financed with the contributions of 
active workers and those of provincial and municipal government employers. The provincial 
regimes granted three types of benefits: ordinary retirement, disability retirement, and death 
benefits.   
In general, the provincial regimes had very generous eligibility conditions. As shown in 
Table 1, in most jurisdictions the minimum age was less than 60 years both for men and women. 
Besides, in the case of provincial special pension regimes like those of the police, teachers and 
justice there are specific (and even more generous) standards regarding age and other 
requirements.
14 
                                                           
13 “Pensiones graciables” are extraordinary pensions that can be granted by the provincial executive independently 
of the individual’s contributions to the system. They pay 70 percent of the minimum ordinary pension.  
14 In the case of Entre Rios the teachers’ pension regime does not state a minimum age for retirement, but rather 
requires only 25 years of active work. This generated a great quantity of “young pensioners,” since in this 
jurisdiction most public employees work in education (Novedades Economicas, 1993). 





































Buenos Aires 14 12 60 60 35 22 16 12 50 50 30 22 18 20 no minimum no minimum no minimum
Catamarca SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP 13 18 50 50 22/25
Córdoba 14.5 20 58 55 30 30 14.5 22 55 50 25 25 17 23 55/58 53/56 25/30
Corrientes 18.5 18.5 65 60 30 30 18.5 18.5 65 60 30 30 18.5 18.5 50/55 50/55 s/d
Chaco 11/14 16/18 60 60 30 30 14 18 no minimum no minimum 30 30 14 18 42 42 17
Chubut 10 14 55 55 30 16 12 14 no minimum no minimum 30 16 14 18 no minimum no minimum 25/30
Entre Ríos 16 16 62 57 30 30 13 8.5 57 52 25 25 10 17 43/46 43/46 25/27
Formosa 7 10 55 50 s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d 15 21 s/d s/d s/d
Jujuy 12 14 55 60 25/30 25 14 16 no minimum no minimum 30 20 14 16 no minimum no minimum no minimum
La Pampa 10 17 60 55 30 20 12 19 57 57 35 35 14 25 no minimum no minimum 25/30
La Rioja 17/20 15.5 60 55 30 20 17 19 no minimum no minimum 30 25 17 23 53/55 48/50 25/30
Mendoza 13 16 65 62 30 30 16 19 52 52 25 25 16 23 50 55 30/35
Misiones 11 13 60 55 30 30 13 16 55 52 30 30 15 16 45/58 43/56 20/36
Neuquén 7 5 s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d
Río negro 11 21 60 60 30 30 13 23 52 52 30 30 13 25 no minimum no minimum 20
Salta 15 18 60 58 30 30 16 19 55 53 30 28 19 20 no minimum no minimum 25/30
San Juan 15 18 63 58 30 30 18 18 s/d s/d s/d s/d 16 18 60 55 30
San Luis 15 12 65 60 30 27 17 17 55 52 25 15 17 20 no minimum no minimum 30
Santa Cruz 12 10 s/d s/d s/d s/d 14 10 s/d s/d s/d s/d 16 18 s/d s/d s/d
Santa Fe 13 12.2 60 55 30 30 13 12.2 50 50 30 30 15 21 no minimum no minimum no minimum
Sgo. Del Estero SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP 18.5 18.5 50 48 20/25
Tucumán 12 14 55 51 30 30 12 14 55 50 30 25 16 20 45/58 43/56 25/30
Tierra del Fuego 13 7.5 55 50 25 25 13 7.5 43 43 25 25 s/d s/d s/d s/d s/d
MCBA SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP SIJP
SIJP (Nacional) 11 16 65 60 30 30
Source: Secretaría de Programación Económica y Regional
Police Regime 
Age requirements Years of s
contr
General Regime
Age requirenments Years of service and 
contribution
Teachers Regime
Age requirenments Years of service and 
contribution
  17Additionally, some jurisdictions (for example, Cordoba and Rio Negro) permitted early 
retirement for a limited time, allowing access to the pension benefits with a significant reduction 
in the age requirement and other legal requisites, with the objective of reducing personnel. 
These generous conditions, in particular early retirement, implied, together with 
demography, a very low ratio of active to inactive workers—a key variable determining the 
sustainability of a pay-as-you-go system. There is some evidence that this ratio has been 
declining in recent years, though historical series for this indicator are not available. Table 2 
shows the value for the ratio of passive and active workers in 1994 for 17 provinces.  For some 
jurisdictions this ratio is quite low, though still higher than that at the national level.  
Another factor that contributed to generate deterioration in the financial situation of the 
provincial social security system was the relatively high level of benefits in relation to the 
average wage of the active workers. As we see in Table 2, for example, in Misiones, Entre Rios 
and Formosa the average pension payment was even larger than the average wage in the 
Provincial and Municipal public sector. 
 
Table 2. Provincial Pension Systems: Economic and Finance Indicators, 1994 
  
  pension payments average wage active / passive pension deficit (1) 
   in pesos  in pesos  ratio  in million of pesosas % of PE (2) 
          
Santiago del Estero  769.1  s/d  s/d  45.2  65.5% 
Catamarca 617.4  s/d  s/d  25.2  45.8% 
GCBA (3)  582  628  1.83  193.0  43.8% 
Jujuy 795.6  879.6  3.39  45.1  34.4% 
Santa Cruz  s/d  s/d  s/d  25.7  32.9% 
San Juan  836.7  946.7  2.01  64.7  30.0% 
Santa Fe  732.7  955.4  2.39  138.6  29.2% 
Tucuman 698.4  787  2.23  51.7  21.3% 
San Luis  607  990.9  2.22  16.3  20.6% 
Entre Rios  971.3  894.5  3.03  54.2  19.9% 
Chubut s/d  s/d  s/d  12.7  18.4% 
Corrientes 708.9  722  2.68  31.9  18.3% 
Buenos Aires  581.2  853  2.64  227.3  16.9% 
Mendoza 664.4  1072.6  2.42  36.9  13.9% 
La Pampa  s/d  s/d  s/d  6.4  12.5% 
La Rioja  814.6  922.6  1.77  15.2  12.5% 
Salta 733.5  857  2.63  21.1  10.7% 
Cordoba 1016.6  1088.7  2.42  67.9  8.6% 
Chaco 850.8  929.9  3.2  14.4  8.1% 
Misiones 875.6  787.3  5.55  4.5  3.8% 
Formosa 798.1  744.6  4.85  2.1  2.2% 
  18Table 2., continued  
  pension payments average wage active / passive pension deficit (1) 
   in pesos  in pesos  ratio  in million of pesosas % of PE (2) 
Rio Negro  1029.1  1101.6  3.34  3.1  1.9% 
Neuquen s/d  s/d  s/d  1.1  1.8% 
Tierra del Fuego  s/d  s/d  s/d  0.0  0.0% 
Total   s/d  901.8  2.65  1104.3  19.3% 
National Regime  299.2  s/d  1.35       
              (1) Budget transfers to social security agencies.      
              (2) PE: Pension expenditure.        
              (3) 1993 data.          
               Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Secretaría de Programación Económica y Regional.    
 
   In part as a consequence of the above factors, since the middle of the 1980s these 
provincial regimes (as well as the national system) entered into a serious crisis. As contributions 
became insufficient to finance benefit levels, the regimes began to show important budgetary 
imbalances. For the 24 jurisdictions taken together, and using the transfers that the provincial 
treasuries had to make to the provincial pension systems as an estimator, the increase in the 
deficits between 1990 and 1994 was around 54 percent, from $596 million in 1990 to 
approximately $1,100 million in 1994. These transfers were of about the same magnitude in 
1995. 
A review of the provincial pensions systems by province (Table 2) shows that in 1994, 
the year before the transfers of the pension system started, the situation varied among provinces. 
In terms of pension benefit expenditures, the most pressing imbalances belonged to Santiago del 
Estero (65 percent of expenditures), Catamarca (45.8 percent), the City of Buenos Aires (43.8 
percent) and  Jujuy (34.4 percent) .  
In the context of that critical financial situation, the Argentine economy was seriously 
affected by the Tequila shock produced by the Mexican devaluation of mid-December 1994. The 
strong financing restriction faced by many provincial jurisdictions during 1995 seriously limited 
the provincial treasuries ability to allocate special funds for covering deficits in provincial 
pension systems. Significant delays in benefit payments resulted. One of the most dramatic cases 
was the province of Rio Negro, eight months in arrears on its payments to retirees in mid-1995. 
Other jurisdictions with important delays in pension payments included Tucuman, Jujuy, Salta 
and San Juan.  
These delays helped to produce an atmosphere favorable for the transfer of provincial 
regimes to the national level, though an understandable distrust existed among public-sector 
  19employee unions, though most retirees supported the move. Some of the newly elected governors 
that were appointed in 1995 took advantage of the situation and accepted the national authorities’ 
offer to transfer the pension system.   
  
The Institutional Setting and Fiscal Costs Involved in the Transfer of the Pension Systems 
 
As noted above, in August of 1993, the national government and the provinces signed a second 
Fiscal Pact called the Federal Pact for Employment, Production and Growth (“Pacto Fiscal para 
el Empleo, la Producción y el Crecimiento”). With this agreement the national government 
sought to introduce substantial reforms at the provincial level. On one hand, in an attempt to 
improve provincial tax systems, the Government negotiated the elimination of distortionary 
provincial taxes; in particular, it pushed for the substitution of the tax on gross revenues by a 
provincial sales tax.
15 On the other hand, the Government also aimed at achieving privatization 
and deregulation of economic activities under the control of the provincial administrations. The 
main incentive that the national authorities offered was the transfer of provincial social security 
systems that were already representing a heavy load for provincial finances (interestingly, the 
wording used in the agreement was that the national government would “accept” those systems).  
But the national government also wanted (through this nationalization) to transform the 
provincial pension systems, making them compatible with the already-reformed national regime. 
In particular, the objective was to eliminate the privileges of different special pension regimes 
and to incorporate progressively the universe of workers into the newly created capitalization 
system. Thus, the actual transfer of the pension systems further involved the signing of a 
“transfer act” which had to be ratified by the local legislature and which established strong 
conditionality clauses. Among them, one established that the province delegated to the Nation 
the ability to legislate in social security matters, and that the province assumed the firm 
commitment not to dictate any laws that directly or indirectly allowed the creation of new 
provincial pension systems. Also, the local government accepted the authority of the National 
Treasury to make withholdings from coparticipation income to cover the payment of the personal 
and employer contributions to the new nationalized system. Finally, a very important clause sets 
forth that the province assumes all the responsibility for the consequences of any judicial action 
                                                           
15 Which never materialized.  
  20promoted by the beneficiaries, even when these actions were based on the alleged 
unconstitutionality of the proposed policy. 
An important aspect to highlight is that when the “Fiscal Pact” was signed there was no 
reliable estimation of the fiscal cost involved. The only information available was the transfers 
that the provincial treasuries had to make to the provincial agencies in charge of operating of the 
pension systems. As will be clear below, this transfer turned out to be a poor estimator of the 
actual fiscal cost that had to be incurred by the central authorities. 
The strong conditionality clauses produced vigorous resistance by active workers and 
their local unions, which was expressed in local legislatures. The shift of responsibility was thus 
achieved relatively easily only in those places where the national government had much stronger 
negotiating power and control of local affairs.  The first provinces to transfer the provincial 
pension systems were Catamarca, Santiago del Estero and the City of Buenos Aires, all in 1994. 
In Santiago del Estero the change coincided with a period in which the province was under the 
intervention of the National Government, while the mayor of City of Buenos Aires was (at the 
time) appointed by the President.
16  In the case of Catamarca, the change took place immediately 
before a federal intervention. 
As the financial and fiscal situation of provinces worsened during 1995 more 
jurisdictions agreed to relinquish their pension systems. In December of 1995 the transfer of 
Salta’s system was negotiated, followed by San Juan and Mendoza the following month and La 
Rioja in March of 1996. Finally, between April and November of that year Jujuy, Rio Negro, 
Tucuman and San Luis accomplished the nationalization of their pension systems.
17 
Table 3 presents the list of provinces (in bold) that during 1994-1996 transferred their 
social security systems to the national level and the “short-run” fiscal cost assumed by the 
national authorities calculated as the deficits between income and expenditures in each provincial 
system. It should be noted that these deficits were higher than the allocations made by provincial 
treasuries, given that when the transfer was executed the province affected extraordinary 
revenues (for example pre-allocation of tax revenues) to meet the pension system deficits.
18 
                                                           
16 This changed after the Constitutional reform of 1994; the City of Buenos Aires became autonomous and had its 
mayor elected directly by the voters for the first time in 1995. 
17  After that there was a change in the Ministry of Economics, and the new team was not enthusiastic about pushing 
for any further consolidation of provincial pension regimes. 
18 In anticipation of this change of rules, several new pensions were granted. 
  21Thus, while aggregate financial cost for the national government was estimated at about $500 
million a year in 1996, it jumped to more than $1,500 million in 1998.
19  
 
Table 3. Nationalization of the Provincial Pension Systems: Fiscal Cost 
      
           
  Date of the   Fiscal cost ( in millon of pesos) 
 Aggreement  Estimated  Actual 
      Year 1996  Year 1998 
      
Santiago del Estero  07/14/1994  s/d  158.8 
Catamarca 07/17/1994  s/d  132 
Salta 12/31/1995  79.8  115.7 
Mendoza 01/26/1996  102 
143 
San Juan  01/30/1996  90.9  135.4 
La Rioja  03/29/1996  64.6  124.8 
Río Negro  05/01/1996  44.5  109.4 
Jujuy 31/06/96  55.0  106.2 
Tucumán 07/15/1996  32.2  192.5 
San Luis  09/18/1996  32.8  48.7 
GCBA s/d  s/d  256.6 
Total     501.8 1523.1 
      
Source: Secretaría de Programación Económica y Regional y Secretaría de Hacienda. 
 
Was a Bailout Extended and If So, What were its Determinants? 
 
In order to see whether this episode can be characterized as a bailout it is convenient to go back 
to the conceptual framework presented in Section 2. It was there indicated that a bailout situation 
is characterized by the presence of two conditions: deviation from a rule and opportunistic 
behavior by a sub-national government, in part motivated by anticipation of the federal 
government’s ex-post incentives to deviate.  
Regarding the first condition, is difficult to understand the nationalization of the 
provincial pension funds as an ex-ante rule that the federal government set well in advance as a 
part of the initial set of reforms that characterized the convertibility period. Indeed, the “Pacto 
Fiscal” that first provided a context for transferring the pension system first appeared can be 
                                                           
19 The national government asked for financial aid from the Inter-American Development Bank and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development to finance a portion of this cost (US$750 million). The program 
incorporated conditionalities for both the Nation and the provinces. It is important to note that a demographic model 
was developed to estimate the fiscal effect of the transfer (Table 4).  As can be observed in the table, the actual fiscal 
cost far exceeded the estimates. 
  22interpreted as an ex-post move by the federal government in an attempt to solve the already 
serious problems that the pension system deficits were causing. Though compelled to act, the 
federal government still wanted to obtain some advantages in exchange. In this sense, a key 
objective was to reform the provincial pension systems (so as to make them more sustainable 
intertemporally); it also sought to introduce other reforms in provincial finances and to obtain 
more funds (through pre-coparticipations) in order to finance the national social security 
system’s growing deficit. In sum, the “Pacto Fiscal” was a complex ex-post trade.  
To what extent was this intervention anticipated ex-ante by provincial authorities, thus 
motivating their more expansive behavior? This is a difficult question to answer given the 
information available. Nevertheless, many of the provincial systems that were later on 
transferred have been very generous in terms of eligibility requirements and pension benefit 
payments. Even though before August 1993 (when the Pact was signed) it could have been 
difficult to anticipate the intervention of the federal government through this scheme, provincial 
authorities could have anticipated other types of financial aid (e.g., national treasury 
contributions) that were more common at that time. In any case, at the end of 1993 the possibility 
of nationalizing the provincial system was already “available” and there is evidence that some 
jurisdictions accelerated the granting of very benevolent pensions before transferring the system. 
Also, the federal government passively absorbed the provincial pension outlays independently of 
the magnitude of the imbalances that were present in the systems. The conditionality involved in 
the operation did not depend on the lower or higher deficit presented in each province.  
Still, there was no rush by provincial government to accept the national authorities’ 
“offer.” So why is that some provinces accepted and others not? What were the determinants that 
pushed the federal government to act in the case of some jurisdictions (and the local authorities 
to favor that intervention) and not to intervene in the case of others? To perform the analysis of 
the determinants it is convenient to recall the framework presented in Section 2. In that 
framework, the cost of adjustment that the local jurisdiction has to endure to avoid bailout is a 
critical factor affecting the ex-post incentives of the federal government. In this case the cost can 
be measured by the magnitude of the deficit in the pension system both in terms of total pension 
expenditures and, especially, in terms of provincial total own revenues. 
Table 4 presents information on these indicators. The data suggest that, in general, the 
social security systems transferred were those with the greatest imbalances. Undoubtedly, the 
  23fiscal benefit (in terms of avoiding fiscal adjustment) in those provinces was significant.
20  
Regarding the cost of adjusting internally, provinces had two instruments for doing so: on one 
end to push for a reform that tightened the requisites to access pension benefits, on the other, 
assigning tax revenues to compensate the disequilibria.
21 
In fact, there has been no provincial reform, which permanently tightened the retirement 
conditions (no one took the first avenue).  Some provinces did assign specific taxes to reinforce 
the financing of their pension systems; in general they used internal taxes and lottery taxes (as 
did, for example, Buenos Aires and Mendoza).  The provinces’ ability to obtain resources was 
limited given the magnitude of the deficits, though, making it almost impossible to resolve their 
fiscal dilemmas through these channels. 
                                                           
20 There were some exceptions to this rule: Mendoza, which decided to transfer its system to the Nation even when 
its imbalance was relatively low (equivalent to 13.9 percent of pension expenditures), and Santa Cruz and Santa Fe, 
which decided not to transfer their social security systems though they had important imbalances in their systems 
(32.9 percent for the former, and 29.2 percent for the latter). In the case of Mendoza, it should be noted that the 
retirement fund had extraordinary tax receipts assigned to it, which diminished its imbalance considerably. 
21 It is true that many provinces passed emergency laws that ameliorated, although temporarily, the disequilibria in 
the pension systems. 
  24Table 4. Nationalization of the Provincial Pension Systems: Economic and Political Determinants
Provinces
                           
in millions in terms of in terms of political cost (2) party affiliation 
pension  provincial tax revenues Year 1996 Year 1996 Representatives Senators
Ciudad de Buenos Aires  Yes 193.0 43.8 8.2% 4.2% Inter.Federal M.C.B.A. 2,352,892
Buenos Aires No 227.3 16.9 6.2% 5.4% PJ 47.8% PROVINCIA DE B.A. 3,642,000
Catamarca Yes 25.2 45.8 95.8% 18.5% FC 48.8% 62.0% CATAMARCA 26,312
Córdoba No 67.9 8.6 7.9% 5.4% UCR 54.6% CORDOBA 860,235
Corrientes No 31.9 18.3 45.1% 9.2% PAL 50.0% CORRIENTES 70,780
Chaco No 14.4 8.1 17.8% 9.1% PJ 31.3% CHACO 81,104
Chubut No 12.7 18.4 24.3% 12.5% UCR 59.3% CHUBUT 52,207
Entre Ríos No 54.2 19.9 21.8% 8.3% PJ 53.6% ENTRE RIOS 248,440
Formosa No 2.1 2.2 7.7% 15.9% PJ 60.0% FORMOSA 27,356
Jujuy Yes 45.1 34.4 90.5% 11.4% PJ 52.1% JUJUY 49,808
La Pampa No 6.4 12.5 7.7% 9.5% PJ 57.7% LA PAMPA 82,841
La Rioja Yes 15.2 12.5 65.3% 23.2% PJ 96.4% LA RIOJA 23,276
Mendoza Yes 36.9 13.9 8.6% 6.8% PJ 54.1% 52.6% MENDOZA 427,499
Misiones No 4.5 3.8 5.5% 8.1% PJ 52.5% MISIONES 82,096
Neuquen No 1.1 1.8 0.9% 16.9% MPN 62.9% NEUQUEN 116,015
Río Negro Yes 3.1 1.9 2.5% 12.6% UCR 51.1% RIO NEGRO 125,875
Salta Yes 21.1 10.7 20.4% 9.2% PJ 70.0% 86.9% SALTA 103,540
San Juan Yes 64.7 30.0 103.2% 9.9% PJ 62.2% SAN JUAN 62,672
San Luis Yes 16.3 20.6 21.4% 10.4% PJ 60.5% 100.0% SAN LUIS 76,050
Santa Cruz No 25.7 32.9 47.5% 22.4% PJ 62.5% SANTA CRUZ 54,139
Santa Fe No 138.6 29.2 16.2% 6.1% PJ 56.0% SANTA FE 853,451
Santiago del Estero  Yes 45.2 65.5 78.6% 8.9% Inter. Federal SANTIAGO  DEL  ESTERO 57,509
Tucuman Yes 51.7 21.3 33.2% 8.4% FR 37.5% TUCUMAN 155,863
Tierra del Fuego No 0.0 0.0 0.0% 18.6% MPF 46.7% TIERRA  DEL  FUEGO 48,579
TOTAL 9,680,541
(1) Budget transfers to social security agencies. 
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The cost of adjustment indicator calculated as the pension system deficit as a proportion 
of the province’s own revenues (see Table 4) indicates that for some provinces the tax effort 
needed to finance these deficits would have been quite significant. Even if they allocated all their 
own revenues to the pension system the deficits could not have been financed.  
Another determinant emphasized in Section 2 was the political cost/benefit the federal 
government and the local government have to bear for engaging in a bailout operation. In the 
case of the provincial pension systems, given the conditionality imposed by the federal 
government (in terms of the features of the newly nationalized regime), there was a basic trade- 
off involved. In each jurisdiction the benefit provided by the elimination of the deficit in their 
pension systems (basically the avoidance of a fiscal adjustment) have to be compared with the 
political cost associated with the inclusion of active public employees in a more restrictive social 
security system. In this regard, the fact that the transfers accelerated somehow after mid-1995, 
when national and provincial elections were held, suggests that to have this issue in the pre-
electoral agenda would have implied important political costs.     
To quantify the impact of this phenomenon, political cost is measured as the percentage 
of public employees (both in the provincial and the municipal levels) within the total quantity of 
voters in each province. Table 4 shows a high participation of public employment in the number 
of voters in the case of Catamarca, Chubut, Formosa, La Rioja, Neuquén, Santa Cruz and Tierra 
del Fuego.  Among, this group, only Catamarca and La Rioja transferred their social security 
systems.  Due to the fact that the deficit was considerably high in these provinces, it is very 
probable that the fiscal benefit compensated the higher political cost.  
Another political variable that could have played an important role is whether the party 
ruling at the national level also controlled the provincial administration. Given that the transfer 
of the pension system was, at least initially, part of a broader trade between provinces and the 
national government, it may be that, if party discipline is important, then other things constant 
Peronist (or federal intervened) provinces would have had more incentives to participate 
compared to non-Peronist jurisdictions. As shown in Table 4, many of the provinces that 
transferred their pension system were run by the Peronist party or were under federal 
intervention (i.e., Santiago del Estero), though the provinces of Rio Negro and Catamarca, 
governed by Radical administrations, joined the transfer scheme. 
  26The final political variable to consider is the composition of the provincial legislature, 
since the transfer required its ratification through a provincial law.  Table 4 shows information 
on this variable.  With the exceptions of Catamarca and Tucuman, the governors that decided to 
transfer had a political majority in their legislatures.  
In order to assess more formally the impact of the identified variables two types of 
statistical exercises are conducted. One compares the means of the variables for the two groups 
of provinces (the provinces that transferred the pension and the provinces that did not), using 
parametric and non-parametric tests. A second exercise estimates the impact of the different 
variables on the probability that a given province transfers its pension system.  
Table 5 shows the means of the variables for the two groups of provinces. When the 
deficit is measured in terms of pension expenditures, the jurisdictions that transferred the pension 
system have deficits twice those of the other group. An even greater difference in the means is 
obtained when the deficit is measured in terms of provincial tax. The percentage of provinces 
that were governed by the same party as the President is also higher for first group. On the other 
hand, the political cost variable has practically the same mean for both groups.  
The next step is to test the statistical significance of the differences in the means. This is 
done with parametric (t-statistic) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon) tests. The results are shown in 
Table 6. Only the pension deficit as percentage of expenditures and the same variable measured 
in terms of provincial taxes have a significant different in means for the two groups. This result 
is robust since it is found in all the tests. Given this result it is not surprising to find that in the 
Probit estimation only these variables came out with the right sign and significant (see Table 7).
22 
Nevertheless, the very reduced level for the R2 indicator suggests that our model leaves a 
significant proportion of the decision to transfer unexplained. 
                                                           
22 As few observations are available, only one variable is introduced in each estimation. 
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Table 5. Means of Variables, Transferring Provinces and Others   
                    
Variables  All Provinces  Provinces that Transfer Provinces that do not transfer
   Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean 
Pension system deficit as a percentage of Expenditures 
24 0.197  11  0.273  13  0.133 
Pension system deficit as percentage of own revenues 
24 0.369  11  0.587  13  0.184 
Political Cost  24 0.113  11  0.112  13  0.113 
Governor's Party  24 0.667  11  0.727  13  0.615 
Divided Government  22 0.227  9  0.222  13  0.231 
  
Table 6. Statistical Significance of Difference in Means    
                   
Variables  T-test  Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
  





by the Pension 
System) as a 
percentage of 
Expenditures 0.133  0.273  -2.3023* -2.1990*  -3.161   
Pension system 
deficit as 
percentage of own 
revenues  0.184 0.587 -2.7584*  -2.6082* -2.636**   
Political Cost  0.113 0.112 0.0501  0.0502 -0.29   
Governor's Party  0.6153 0.7272  -0.5586 -0.5626  -0.567   
Divided 
Government 0.2307  0.2222 0.0448  0.0448  0.046   
 
 
Table 7. Probit Estimation of Means 
        
Probit Estimation  Probability of transfer 
    
Independent Variable  Probability of transfer. 
Constant 0.946* -0.811* 
 (-1.968) (-2.064) 
Pension System deficit as 
percentage of expenditures 
4.418*  
 (2.017)  
2.066*  Pension system deficit as a 
percentage of tax revenues  (2.258) 
    
Pseudo R2  0.1598 0.2122 
    
Note: "t" statistic in parenthesis; "**" significant at 1% level; 
"*" significant at 5% level.     
  283.2 Treasury Loans to Provinces (in the form of BOTESO 10) during 1992-94 
 
Between 1992 and 1994 the federal government provided financial assistance to seven provinces 
that were experiencing fiscal and financial difficulties. Financial aid took the form of handling 
national treasury bonds available at the federal level at that time. Using this ad hoc mechanism 
the central government granted loans for a total of US$ 800 million. The following subsection 
briefly describes the economic and fiscal situation of the jurisdictions that received this 
assistance and the main features of the loans, in particular, the terms of the contracts and whether 
conditionality was involved. Subsequently discussed is the institutional and political context in 
which these jurisdictions received the assistance, with a general appraisal of the episode as a case 
of bailout. 
  
The Economic and Fiscal Background in the Assisted Provinces and the Main Features of the 
Loans 
 
Table 8 presents the list of the seven provinces that were favored with these operations, the date 
when the rescue took place, the amount received, the fiscal deficit in the provinces in the 
previous year and other fiscal and economic indicators. Most of the jurisdictions that received 
the assistance were relatively poor provinces that were suffering serious fiscal deficits and 
increasing debt in the period immediately before they received the loans. Moreover, the 
possibility for these jurisdictions of obtaining new debt in the financial markets was seriously 
damaged because they already had a high proportion of their coparticipation income committed 
to the execution of loan guarantees taken in previous years.  
  29Table 8. Treasury Loans Made in Bonds (BOTESO 10): Provincial Fiscal Indicators in Millions of Pesos       
                        
          Fiscal indicators  (year 1994)         
Amount Date Fiscal Outcome(1)   
         in millions In % of expenditures  Debt stock (2)  Debt service (3)   
 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires  0    76.4  2.8  103.2%  386.9    2740
Buenos Aires  0    -304.4 
 
3.8  37.8%  241.3    8049
Catamarca     
         
   
         
           
       
         
           
       
           
   
           
     
70  01/20/1994
 
-97.9  20.1  78.8% 23.0   487
Cordoba 0   -399.3 15.7 46.7%  147.3 2542
Corrientes   70  10/09/1992  -84.2  15.3  s/d  36.3    549
Corrientes   199.9  03/25/1994 
 
-35.6  5.2  89.3% 150.8   681
Chaco 0   -55.4 7.3 76.6%  52.1 760
Chubut 0   -184.1 29.9 14.4%  45.7 616
Entre Rios  0    -71.5  6.9  41.7%  75.9    1035
Formosa 150  06/30/1994
 
-146.3  21.5  68.3% 227.6   682
Jujuy 0   -128.7 19.4 42.1%  17.4 662
La Pampa  0    -35.7  7.6  0.0%  0.7    469
La Rioja  0    -21.0  4.1  120.3%  19.8    518
Mendoza 0   -10.2 0.8 20.3%  60.5 1312
Misiones 6  03/08/1994
 
-76.4  11.6  42.6% 15.3   661
Neuquen 0   -126.6 14.0 7.5% 68.2 906
Rio Negro  68  01/21/1994  -168.4  22.0  61.1% 19.2   765
Salta 0   -52.6 6.6 37.9%  43.5 796
San Juan  0    -252.1  31.6  51.5%  16.5    798
San Luis  0    -11.3  2.5  0.0%  0.1    445
Santa Cruz  0    -45.7  8.8  16.3%  4.6    520
Santa Fe  0    -1.3  0.1  18.1%  5.4    2199
Santiago del Estero  78  11/26/1993  -77.0  11.3  s/d  45.2     681
Santiago del Estero (6)  80.4  03/21/1994  -23.2  3.2  26.4% 61.2 718
Tucuman 80  07/14/1994        -25.1  2.8  7.3% 35.9 904
Tierra del Fuego  0     -85.7  24.1  61.0%  6.3     355
(1) Not including privatizations.               
(2) As % of provincial expenditures.               
(3) Interest on debt plus amortization.               
Source: Authors' calculations.               
          
 
  30The importance of the rescue operation involved in these loans can be appreciated by the 
fact that these funds represented a significant proportion of the financial needs of the 
jurisdictions. If only the loans granted during 1994 are considered, it can be seen that these loans 
covered 89.5 percent of these provinces’ financing needs in that year. When the loans made to 
Corrientes in 1992 and to Santiago del Estero in 1993 are included, the total amount of resources 
provided reached $800 million. 
To understand the reasons why the federal government used such an instrument to assist 
the jurisdictions, it should be considered that since 1991, with the establishment of the 
convertibility plan, the federal government faced much stronger restrictions on aiding financially 
distressed provinces. Neither direct loans from the treasury nor Central Bank rediscounts were 
possible alternatives. In addition, most of the other transfers to provinces were implemented 
through automatic mechanisms that left little room for discretionary operations of the magnitude 
that was required.  Thus one way out from these restrictions was to use the remaining amount of 
treasury bonds that the national government issued in 1992.
23 
The institutional set-up used to grant these loans was an agreement between each 
province and the national government.  These agreements were designed by the Ministry of 
Economy and were signed by the National Treasury Secretary and by the Province’s Governor. 
The texts of the agreements already offered some justifications for the rescue operation. For 
example, they stated that the economic-financial difficulties in the province could conspire 
against the jurisdiction’s political and social stability and therefore justified financial 
intervention from the federal government.  
In this context, and to avoid a new situation where the provinces were to ask for funds 
again in the future, some of the agreements established fiscal conditionality clauses. They 
included targets for the reduction of the fiscal deficit, freezing the number of public employees, 
and a prohibition on contracting new debt.
24 
                                                           
23 Article 2 of Decree 211/92 sets forth the following characteristics of the public title: a) Denomination: Funds of 
the Treasury to 10 years of term; b) Currency of emission: American dollars; c) Total amount of the emission:  five 
hundred million (U$S 500 millions); d) emission date: April of 1990; e) Maturity: 10 years; f) Amortization: it will 
be made in thirty (30) successive quarterly installments. The first twenty-nine (29) payments will be equivalent to 
(3.30 percent), and the last to (4.30 percent), of the amount emitted plus the capitalized interests yielded during the 
first thirty (30) months. The first installment dues after the first thirty three (33) months of the emission date; g) 
Interest: the rate paid three-month eurodollar deposits in the London Market (LIBOR). The interest will be 
capitalized during the first thirty (30) months and will be paid together with the amortization payments. 
24 As explained below, these targets were not achieved. 
  31Once the agreement was signed, the province took the bonds to a private sector financial 
agent, who had to carry out a gradual placement of these bonds in the market so as guarantee a 
normal absorption of the titles, avoiding pronounced decreases in their prices. Nevertheless, as 
shown in Figure 2, these decreases could not be avoided, at least in the first quarter of 1994, 
when there is a significant drop in the price of these financial titles, coincident with the 
launching of many of these loan operations. This generated a fiscal cost to provinces given the 



















































































































































 The agreements also included a clause explicitly stating that the loans should be canceled 
through the automatic utilization of the resources that the provinces have by virtue of the 
coparticipation regime of law 23.548. This clause assured that the loans were to be paid back on 
the originally established dates. Indeed, when the loans came due the national government 
started retaining the amortization and interest payments from the coparticipation funds 
corresponding to each jurisdiction.  
 
Was a Bailout Extended and, If So, What Were Its Determinants? 
 
In this episode it is clear that the federal government’s intervention did not correspond with any 
pre-established rule. The handing of public bonds to provinces was not included within any of 
  32the federal fiscal institutions that regulated the fiscal relationship between the central and 
provincial governments. As the national authorities originally issued those bonds to pay their 
own obligations, the federal government’s intervention in this case meets one of the conditions 
of bailout discussed in Section 2. It is more difficult to find direct evidence regarding moral 
hazard or opportunistic behavior on the part of the sub-national government (motivated, in part, 
by the anticipation of the federal government reaction). Nevertheless, as shown above, these 
provinces were running significant and unsustainable fiscal deficits for several years. Moreover, 
some of them received the same type of discretionary transfers on two occasions, proving that 
they did not believe federal government statements that the provinces would not be rescued 
again. This episode of handling national bonds to provincial administrations in financial 
problems thus meets the definition of bailout.     
But how much money was involved in these bailout operations, and what was the 
magnitude of the gifts or subsidies involved? At first glance it may seem that, given that loans 
were eventually repaid in full by most provinces, there was no gift involved and the whole 
episode was just a simple loan operation. But this is not the case in light of the fact that these 
loans implied a lower financial cost than other financing alternatives. The key issue is that these 
bonds paid a rate significantly smaller (even considering the rise in the implicit rate mentioned 
above) than other alternatives available for provincial governments at that time. In other words, 
provinces were able to borrow at a rate that reflected the risk premium of the federal government 
rather than their own (higher) risk premium.
25   
Also, although the agreements included conditionality clauses, those clauses were never 
operative in practice.  On the contrary, the fiscal situations in most provinces that received the 
loans continued to deteriorate afterwards. In some cases, like Santiago del Estero and Corrientes, 
the national government had to come again to the rescue using the same type of loans in two and 
one opportunities, respectively.  
   Why was the federal government willing to support the provinces in the way it did? 
Why those provinces and not others? Table 9 presents a series of economic and political 
indicators that were suggested by the analysis presented in Section 2 and can help to explain the 
determinants of bailout. 
                                                           
25 A similar case occurred at the international level when, in the aftermath of the Tequila crisis, the US Treasury 
granted Mexico a loan at below market rates. Though Mexico eventually paid back the full amount of the loans, it 
received an implicit gift by the saving in interest payments.  
  33On the one hand, and starting by the cost of adjustment, the financial situation of many of 
the jurisdictions that had received financial aid in BOTESO 10 was indeed very complicated, 
with fiscal deficits higher than 20 percent of expenditures. The pressing fiscal problem of these 
jurisdictions was reflected in significant arrears in the salaries of public employees and suppliers. 
Could the involved jurisdictions have adjusted on their own without the assistance of federal 
authorities? To assess this possibility, an indicator was constructed of the cost of adjustment 
measured as the ratio of the deficit to provincial own revenues. As shown in Table 9, in 
provinces like Catamarca and Formosa, the deficits represented more than three times what they 
collected in local taxes. This indicator is quite high for most of the jurisdiction that received 
BOTESO loans, suggesting that jurisdictions would have to go through a significant cost if they 
were deprived of federal assistance. Of course one key determinant of this phenomenon is that 
most of these jurisdictions have a very high level of vertical fiscal imbalance; that is, they control 
only a small part of the total amount of resources they receive (see Table 9). 
 
  34Table 9. Treasury Loans Made in Bonds (BOTESO 10): Determinants of Bailout         
                     
   
Cost of adjustment     Political-economy consideration      
  Legislature  
  
Amount 









Ciudad de Buenos Aires  0  0.03  0.931078549  0.113830054        
Buenos Aires  0  0.074  0.52839613  0.370521403  1  0.4783    35
Catamarca             
         
          
          
       
       
         
     
   
     
            
       
         
        
   
       
          
           
              
70  3.314 0.075885636 0.007890927 0 0.4878 0.62 20
Cordoba 0  0.389  0.478782601  0.089492835 0 0.5455 30
Corrientes   70  0.209 0.150269028 0.024259326 1  
Corrientes   199.9  0.938 0 0.024259326 1 0.5 25
Chaco 0  0.605  0.129842532  0.024527484 0 0.3125   25
Chubut 0  1.325  0.323790751  0.00996872 0 0.5926   17.5
Entre Rios  0  0.232  0.309018434  0.032574468  1  0.5357    22.5
Formosa 150  3.711 0.073683238 0.010908851 1 0.6    20
Jujuy 0  1.002  0.240764896  0.013549314 1 0.5208    27.5
La Pampa  0  0.276  0.29956924  0.008518178  1  0.5769    35
La Rioja  0  0.384  0.110431609  0.006724789  1  0.9643 0.526 12.5
Mendoza 0  0.014  0.499348528  0.041869364 1 0.541    40
Misiones 6  0.743 0.172082903 0.021264464 1 0.525 15
Neuquen 0  0.267  0.607767497  0.010739797 0 0.6286   22.5
Rio Negro  68  0.804 0.350778651 0.012853422 0 0.511  0.869 20
Salta 0  0.254  0.278605663  0.024178861 0 0.7 17.5
San Juan  0  3.043  0.151834242  0.016005109  1  0.622 1 10
San Luis  0  0.132  0.197588184  0.00911623  1  0.6047    35
Santa Cruz  0  0.247  0.360776062  0.004186363  1  0.625    17.5
Santa Fe  0  0.001  0.470981379  0.090226545  1  0.56    25
Santiago del Estero  78  1.5  s/d  0.020210066 1 0.511  
Santiago del Estero (3)  80.4  0.969 0.124062616 0.020210066 1 22.5
Tucuman 80  0.457 0.318955661 0.034344254 1 0.375   22.5
Tierra del Fuego  0  0.238  0.228713935  0.002238768  0 
 
0.4667     15
 
 
  35Under these circumstances, to what extent were the federal government’s ex-post 
incentives affected by political economy considerations? To analyze this issue, a variable was 
constructed measuring each jurisdiction’s share of the total national electorate. As seen in Table 
9, most of the jurisdictions that received assistance from the federal government were not very 
important in terms of national votes. This is not surprising given that they are relatively small 
and poor jurisdictions. On the other hand, it is also interesting to consider whether there was any 
regularity in terms of the party affiliation of the jurisdiction that received assistance from the 
national authorities. In this regard the data shown in Table 10 suggest that BOTESO loans have 
been granted independently of political affiliation. For example loans have been granted to 
provinces belonging to the opposition (Río Negro and Catamarca), provinces with Peronist   
governors (Misiones, Tucuman and Santiago del Estero) and provinces under federal 
intervention (Corrientes and Santiago del Estero).   
 
Table 10. BOTESO Loans and Political Indicators       
            
Variables  All Provinces  Provinces that Received Bonds 
Provinces 
that Did Not Receive Bonds
   Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean 
            
Cost of Adjustment  26 0.8135 9  1.4044 17  0.5006
Vertical Imbalance  25 0.2964 8  0.1575 17  0.3618
Share of Voters  26 0.0388 9  0.0178 17  0.0500
Divided Government  23 0.2609 8  0.2500 15  0.2667
Presidential Party  25 0.5600 9  0.4444 16  0.6250
Institutional Index  25 23.4000 9  21.9444 16  24.2188
 
As in the case of the last episode, it is useful to formally investigate the statistical 
significance of the above-indicated variables in the national government’s decision to bail out 
some provinces. The techniques applied to the provincial pension system episode. Table 10 
shows the mean values for the relevant variables for the two groups.
26  As already suggested, 
provinces that received loans have a higher mean deficit, face a higher cost of adjustment and 
also have a higher vertical fiscal imbalance.   In regard to political variables, the table shows that 
the provinces bailed out have, on average, a smaller share of national votes than those that did 
                                                           
26 The total number of province-years when a bailout was observed is nine, with seven in year 1994, and two other 
cases: Corrientes in 1992 and Santiago del Estero in 1993.  
  36not receive loans. In addition, the jurisdictions bailed out belonged largely to parties other than 
that in power at the national level.  
Table 11 shows the results of the different tests. Only the differences in the cost of 
adjustment and in the vertical imbalance came out statistical significant using the three tests. 
Thus it is not surprising that these variables are significant in the Probit estimation (see Table 
12).  Though the explanatory power of the regressions are not very high, we can conclude that 
the adjustment cost has been a significant determinant of the decision of the federal government 
to bailout these provinces thorough the BOTESO instrument.  
 
Table 11. T-Test and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test Results    
          
Variables  T-test  Wilcoxon rank-sum test
  
Mean (0)  Mean(1)  t  t (unequal 
variance) 
z 
          
Cost of Adjustment  0.5005  1.4044 -2.3266* -1.9920^  -2.561* 
Vertical Imbalance  0.3617  0.1575 2.5603*  3.0807*  2.448 
Share of Voters  0.05  0.01777 1.073  1.4834  0.14 
Divided Government  0.2666 0.25  0.0829  0.0826  0.085 
Presidential Party  0.625  0.4444 0.8504  0.8374  0.855 




Table  12. Probit Estimation of Probability of Receiving Bonds   
       
Independent Variable  Probability of receiving bonds 
Constant 0.948 -0.9088* -1.0254* 0.2881 
 (1.494) (-2.502) (-2.032) (0.327) 
-5.7855*   Vertical Imabalance 
(-2.259)  
0.5977*   Cost of Adjustment 
(2.031)  
Institutional index      -0.0281 
     (-0.758) 
      
Pseudo R2  0.2588 0.145 0.0468 0.0181 
Note: "t" statistic in parenthesis; "**" significant at 1% level;   




  373.3 Provincial Fiscal Crises and National Treasury Contributions 
 
National Treasuries Contributions are discretionary transfers made by the central government to 
financially distressed provinces without any obligation to repay. The discretionary character of 
the National Treasury Contributions (NTC) comes mostly from the fact that its distribution 
among provincial jurisdictions is left totally unspecified and at the will of the national 
authorities. Thus these transfer represented an “open window” through which the federal 
authorities may accommodate expansive and unsustainable fiscal behavior by the provinces. 
Described below is the legal framework that regulates the working of these transfers and their 
aggregate evolution in the last 25 years. Subsequently examined is the distribution of these funds 
among different provinces, with an attempt to understand the logic of this distribution in terms of 
both economic and political economy considerations. The subsection ends with an appraisal of 
the working of these transfers as a possible mechanism behind bailout-type episodes.  
 
The Legal Framework Regulating the National Treasury Contributions (NTCs) and their 
Evolution over Time and Across Jurisdictions 
 
The origin of this type of transfers can be traced out to the National Constitution.  Article 67, part 
8 reads, “It corresponds to Congress to establish subsidies from the National Treasury to 
provinces whose tax income does not match ordinary expenses set up in their budgets.” 
Following this constitutional prescription, Tax Sharing Law 23548 of 1988, which is currently in 
effect, established that these transfers would be financed with 1 percent of the pool of shared tax 
resources, and that the objective of these transfers is “to address emergency situations and 
financial disequilibria in the finances of provincial governments.” The law also placed the 
Interior Ministry in charge of distributing the funds and reporting on the use of these resources. 
The NTC had a long history in the National-Provincial fiscal regime. Until 1935 they 
were the only funds that the central government delivered to the jurisdictions. After that year 
other automatic transfers to distribute federal resources across jurisdictions joined the NTC. 
Figure 3 shows the aggregate evolution of NTC during the last 25 years, together with the funds 
distributed through automatic transfers. In general it is possible to notice a negative association 
between these two series, suggesting that discretionary NTC transfers were used when automatic 
  38transfers declined.
27 For example, in the 1970s and mid-1980s, when inflation rose considerably, 
the increasing use of NTC was a way for provinces to share in national government resources 
derived from the inflation tax (which, on the other hand, was causing a decline in the real value 

























































































NTC as % of  automatic tr ansf er s Autom atic Transfers
 
 
Between 1985 and 1988 the NTC played a central role in the financial relationships 
between the Nation and Provinces. The absence of a federal tax sharing agreement—as the 
framework established by Law 20.221 expired at the end of 1984—left the NTC as the only legal 
framework through which the central government distributed federal resources among provincial 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the NTC system was totally discretionary, with no criteria to guide 
the distribution of funds. Thus, federal authorities were subject to increasing pressures from 
provinces and those with a better “technology” to do so (i.e., strong political clout) were able to 
increase their share of total resources.
28 
 
                                                           
27 More generally, it would be desirable to look at NTCs as a component in the larger “general-equilibrium” federal 
fiscal game, including even the strategic use of seigniorage as a weapon of the national government (see Saiegh and 
Tommasi, 1998). 
28 As shown below, one province that was very successful in this political game was La Rioja. 
  39 With the sanction of Law 23.548, at the end of 1987, the distribution of the federal funds 
was again under a proper legal framework. The new law established the secondary distribution of 
the new tax-sharing regime and also, as indicated, it set up the legal framework for the NTC.  
The discretionary character of the National Treasury Contributions (NTC) is illustrated 
by the fact that their distribution among provincial jurisdictions is left totally and at the will of 
the national authorities. This feature is reflected in the actual distribution of these funds. As is 
shown in Table 13, during the last years the assignment of NTC was tilted towards a small group 
of jurisdictions. One of the most favored provinces was La Rioja which during 1990-1998 
obtained an average of 33% of the total funds delivered thorough this mechanism.
29 Other 
jurisdictions that made extensive use of these transfers were Tucuman, Salta, Mendoza and 
Corrientes.  
Still the fact that over a more or less prolonged period of time certain provinces have 
been receiving a significant amount of resources from the federal government through NTC does 
not imply a bailout per se. On the one hand, these transfers by design are geared to assist 
provinces in financial distress. So in principle we could have the case that those provinces that 
received more funds during the period under study were subjected more often to shocks 
compared to the other jurisdictions.  Still, given the discretionary character of the NTC, they may 
have been allocated not following any sort of contingent rule, but taking into account other ex-
post considerations like the political affiliation of the governor vis a vis the presidency. If this 
were the case, then the incentives of the of the local government to behave would be distorted 
implying that NTC were at least in part geared to bailout provinces that were politically closer to 
the federal administration. The next section empirically investigates this hypothesis.  
                                                           
29 In this regard it is interesting to note that the increase in La Rioja’s share of total NTC transfers coincided with 
fact that Menem, former governor of that province, held the presidency. 
  40 
Table 13. Distribution of NTC by Province, 1990-1998 in Millions of 1996 
pesos      
             
        
 




        
Province 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
               
Ciudad de Buenos Aires                     -                     -                     -                    -                     -                    -                     -    
Buenos Aires          3,450             9,403          27,536            4,619          11,903             4,420          13,031           14,134             8,530 
Catamarca        11,020             5,163            2,814            2,803            2,533                896                596                627             3,253 
Cordoba          1,129             1,979            5,377            9,333            9,592           11,706            7,634             8,268           14,188 
Corrientes              876            4,642          21,054          49,022          16,494           12,482            6,530             8,823           15,464 
Chaco          3,342             1,160            6,909          11,881          13,645           16,275          11,421             9,380           10,744 
Chubut          3,821                 952            3,593            1,752            4,179             4,031            4,562             3,884             9,993 
Entre Rios          2,764             4,582            8,442          10,480            7,440             7,286            8,618           10,736           19,941 
Formosa          6,856           21,038          17,336            4,268            8,769           13,498          14,731           10,852             8,055 
Jujuy              641            3,318            1,759            6,594            2,691             6,749          12,554           17,230           10,514 
La Pampa          3,261             2,083            8,241            9,110            9,466             6,779            7,813                912           18,841 
La Rioja        13,874           59,081          77,584        108,110        115,362        103,234         108,123           94,973           93,345 
Mendoza          1,382             3,095            9,547            4,746            6,901             2,628            2,892             5,746             7,667 
Misiones          1,870                   60                578            8,059            1,868             1,433            4,085           10,732           12,731 
Neuquen                36                818            4,874            5,638          12,442           14,125          26,867           21,885           30,766 
Rio Negro              759            1,830            8,392            5,702          21,971           15,289            9,035             5,145             5,513 
Salta          8,192             4,330            4,799          14,111          10,036           17,350            1,700           10,902           10,486 
San Juan          4,038             3,868            3,467            4,141            2,786           14,752          17,414           20,407           23,231 
San Luis                99            3,214            4,296            4,014          12,916             6,211            1,640             2,820             3,305 
Santa Cruz          3,252             4,211            4,070            4,205            5,572             5,435            1,879                652             2,216 
Santa Fe          4,589             3,586            3,794          16,404          11,713           10,004            3,250             8,855           15,483 
Santiago del Estero          3,134             1,056            3,090          10,607          17,254           13,528          16,311           16,084           13,980 
Tucuman          6,449             3,943            4,120          17,519            6,965             7,257          13,925           16,792           23,679 
Tierra del Fuego          5,483             5,356          19,597            5,351            4,084             3,225            3,548             5,253             7,674 
Total        90,316  
 
      148,766 
 
      251,269 
 
      318,469 
 
      316,580 
 
      298,593  
 
      298,159 
 
      305,092  
 
      369,600  
   
Source: CECE 1997 and Secretaría de Hacienda.           
 
 
  41The NTC as Contingent Rule to Smooth Shocks in Provincial Finances: Separating Risk-Sharing 
from Redistribution 
 
We are going to interpret the NTC transfers as an implicit contingent rule that helps provincial 
government to moderate the effect of random shocks on their fiscal decisions (taxes and 
expenditures). The Appendix presents a very simple model where federal transfers are motivated 
by this risk-sharing motive. The optimal rule that those transfers have to obey is thus obtained 
from a very simple planning problem. This rule is given by the following condition, 
 




Tj=  amount of NTC transfers received by the j jurisdiction. 
F= the total amount of resources to be distributed across jurisdictions. 
Rj=  revenues of province j. 
R -j=  revenues collected by all provinces minus the j jurisdiction. 
φj= Parameter that is a function of the weights that different provinces receive in the 
federal government's utility function. 
 
Equation (1) thus suggests the very intuitive result that transfers to region j increase when 
there is a bad realization (negative shock) in that province’s tax revenues and also when all other 
jurisdiction receive, as a whole, a good realization. This will assure that public provincial 
expenditures will be proportional across provinces and across states of nature.   
The above optimal risk-sharing rule allows for transfers to be also affected by 
distributional considerations as represented by the different values that the φ parameters can take 
for different jurisdictions. It is easy to show (see the Appendix) that this parameter will decrease 
when the weights of the involved jurisdiction in the federal government utility function rises. 
Notice that this parameter affects not only the constant term but also the slopes of the transfer 
rule. In the empirical implementation of expression (1) performed below it is assumed that this 
parameter is a function of the governor’s party affiliation vis-a-vis that of the president. Thus, the 
weight that jurisdiction j receives in the federal government utility function depends on this 
  42political variable and we hypothesize that being of the same party of the president gives an extra 
bargaining power to the jurisdiction to get an extra share of the total NTC transfers. 
Equation (1) is estimated using panel regressions with data corresponding to the 1983-
1997 period. This is done because there is insufficient annual data perform reliable regressions 
for each province. The sample is composed by 23 provincial jurisdictions and 14 years.
30 
Equation (1) has been estimated normalizing all the variables by the total transfers distributed to 
all provinces (all terms are divided by F). Thus the dependent variable is actually each province’s 
share of total NTC transfers. The explanatory variables Rjt and R-jt include in both cases local tax 
revenues and automatic transfers received from the federal government. The party affiliation 
variable, Prespar, is a dummy that takes the value of one when the party of the governor 
coincides with that of the president. During the chosen sample period there have been important 
changes in ruling party at both the national and provincial levels. Thus the dummy variable 
varies not only across jurisdictions but also across time.   
Table 14 presents the results of the estimation. In Column (1) the regression is run 
without including any political variable. In column (2) the Prespar variable is included affecting 
only the constant of the regression. Finally in equation (3) the full model is run with the political 
variable also affecting the slopes of the local revenue variables. In all specifications, the 
coefficient for the local revenue variable is negative and significant while that corresponding to 
revenues of the rest of the jurisdictions is positive and significant. Thus, as predicted by the 
theory, NTC transfers have worked at least in part as an implicit contingent rule to smooth 
shocks in local government revenues. Beyond this result, there is also evidence that the 
distribution of these discretional transfers has followed political considerations. This is supported 
by the positive and significant value of the Prespar variable when is included as an additional 
constant term in the regression. Thus, other things constant, being from the same party of the 
president increases by 1.3 percentage points the share of a given jurisdiction in the total amount 
of these grants. On the other hand, and in contrast with what is suggested by the theoretical 
model, the political variable has no significant effect on the slopes of the regression.  
 
 
                                                           
30 Omitted from the sample is the Federal District (Capital Federal) given that in most years that jurisdiction was not 
an independent political unit. Also omitted is the year 1989 because in that year there were two different presidents 
(from different parties) at office.  
  43             Table 14.  Panel Regressions (Explanatory Variable: Provincial Share in NTC) 
        
Independent variable  R1  R2  R3 
            
Constant       0.0434  0.039  0.036 
       (8.98)  (7.21)  (5.43) 
Rj (Local revenues)      -0.0043 -0.00401 -0.0035 
       (-4.52)  (-4.08)  (-2.71) 
R-j (Sum of other provinces revenues) 0.00017 0.00014  0.00015 
       (2.84)  (2.13)  (1.88) 
Prespar         0.013  0.021 
         (2.47)  (1.77) 
Prespar*Rj           -0.00041 
           (-0.35) 
Prespar*R-j           -0.000065 
           (-0.53) 
Model       FE  FE  FE 
            
Observations     322  322  322 
            
R2           0.064  0.082  0.082 
"t" statistic in parenthesis.         
 
Did the Uses of NTC Constitute Bailout Episodes?  
 
This section ends with an overall assessment of the working of the NTC transfers in Argentina as 
a mechanism that has served to sustain bailout episodes in the fiscal relationship between 
provincial and federal governments. As indicated earlier, the intervention of the federal 
authorities in case of provincial financial difficulties using NTC was fully contemplated in the 
legislation, so this undermines somewhat the bailout interpretation of these transfers. 
Nonetheless, the findings suggest that in practice the working of these transfers followed other 
types of ex-post considerations. In particular there is a clear bias in the distribution of transfers 
towards those provinces politically close to the party ruling at the federal level. Can this 
estimated bias be interpreted as a measure of bailouts? Section 2 has indicated that any ex-post 
deviation of the federal government from an ex-ante explicit or even implicit rule can be 
interpreted as a bailout. Here an ex-post deviation of the federal government from an implicit 
contingent rule is identified in terms motivated by ex-post political consideration. According to 
this criterion the case of NTC falls within the present definition of bailout. Within this 
interpretation, some of the NTC funds directed to provincial jurisdiction were not justified by the 
  44occurrence of exogenous shocks, but by the political affiliation of the local party in power, and 
this helped to sustained irresponsible fiscal behavior in those jurisdictions.  
 
 
3.4 The Role of the National Government in the Fiscal Crisis of Cordoba 
  
Since the return of democracy in 1983 there have been numerous episodes in which the national 
government has used extraordinary resources to face fiscal and financial crisis at the provincial 
level. The better-know episodes include the recurrent crisis in Jujuy which forced its governor to 
quit in 1998, the 1993 crisis in Tucuman (where divided government was important), and the 
crises of 1993 and 1994 in Santiago del Estero that culminated with riots in which the 
Governor’s house was set fire and the province was placed under federal intervention.   
government. Finally we also have the case of Rio Negro in 1995 where the province went almost 
bankrupt as a combined consequence of accumulated debt and the effects of the Tequila shock. 
As noted above, there were many ways in which the federal government sent extraordinary 
resources to these provinces; the most important included advances of coparticipation resources, 
National Treasury Contributions and loans in public titles (BOTESO 10).   
These crises had several features in common. They occurred in relatively poor 
jurisdictions that had experienced fiscal problems in previous years, and where the social and 
economic situation, aggravated by local political instability, precluded any attempt at reform. At 
the same time, the federal government had come to the rescue motivated not only by the 
magnitude of the crises but also because of the political stakes involved. 
A provincial financial crisis that does not fit this description, however, occurred in 
Cordoba in 1995. Cordoba, a large province that underwent a serious collapse in its finances, was 
run by the opposition party (and within the opposition party, the line most opposed to the central 
administration policies). Did the response of the province and that of the federal government 
differ in this crisis compared to others? Was a bailout granted? In order to answer these 
questions, the events that eventually prompted the financial collapse in 1995 are described 
below. Subsequently analyzed the actions taken by the federal government and the provincial 
government, including the type of financial help handed out by the central authorities as well as 
the measures taken by the province to avert the crises. The subsection closes with a short 
discussion of the possible interpretation of these events as a bailout episode. 
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Cordoba, located in the center of the Argentinean territory, is the third largest Argentine province 
in terms of GDP. Together with Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Mendoza and the City of Buenos Aires 
it represents one of the most “advanced” jurisdictions.   Since the return of democracy the 
Radical party has governed the province. In 1991, Eduardo Angeloz (losing Presidential 
candidate in 1989) was elected for a third term as Governor, thanks to a favorable verdict of the 
provincial supreme court regarding re-reelection. The governor and their local coalition have 
strongly opposed most of the economic policies run at the federal level. It should be noted, 
though, that this derived not only from the fact that Cordoba was run by the opposition, but also 
from a provincial tradition of opposing “centralist” initiatives from the federal authorities.  Thus, 
as discussed above, Cordoba did not join the other provinces in transferring the public sector 
pension system. Also, it refused to sign the two federal fiscal pacts of 1992 and 1993.  Through 
these pacts the provinces agreed to undertake certain reforms in exchange for a guarantee of a 
minimum level of coparticipation transfers.
31  Finally, the province refused to privatize most of 
its provincial public enterprises and banks.   
The fiscal behavior of Cordoba during the second and third terms in office of governor 
Angeloz was characterized by a chronic and growing budgetary imbalance. This imbalance has 
as its immediate cause a rapid increase in public outlays, which rose by 159 percent from 1990 to 
1994, and very poor performance in tax collection (Anuario de la Bolsa de Valores de Cordoba, 
1998). The fiscal deficit reached its maximum value in 1994, with a global deficit of $359 
million, representing 14 percent of expenditures (see Table 15). 
 
Table 15. Cordoba: Main Fiscal Indicators 1991-1997 in Millions of Pesos    
                          
   1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
           
Total income  842 1111 1651 2219 2183 2218 2138 2421
Own resources  364 429 702 871 1026 976 994 956
National transfers  462 665 909 1011 1058 1220 1123 1436
Other (2)  16 17 40 337 99 22 21 29
           
Total Expenditure  980 1264 1808 2386 2542 2403 2056 2349
                                                           
31 As will be discussed below, this refusal turned out to be very costly for the province. 
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Table 15., continued 
Deficit -138 -153 -157 -167 -359 -185 82 72
  - as % of expenditure  -14% -12% -9% -7% -14% -8% 4% 3%
              
Debt payments  4 24 57 84 35 267 403 171
              
Total financial needs  142 177 214 251 394 452 321 99
             
Notes: (1) Updated according to the combined price index, at April 1991 prices.      
(2) The 1993 figure includes 235 million pesos transferred to the Provincial Bank of Cordoba.  
Source: Investment accounts of the Government of Cordoba.          
 
  The accumulation of fiscal deficits in previous years generated a very serious problem 
of debt overhang at the end of 1994, with an outstanding consolidated public debt of around 
$684 million. The main creditors were the official provincial bank, with $400 million, and 
private banks with $115 million (see Table 16). The use of the provincial bank as a source of 
financing is not a new practice, but Cordoba had been engaging in it at an accelerating pace. In 
1993 for example, in a desperate move to obtain fresh resources, the provincial administration 
“sold” to the provincial bank the “asset” of unpaid taxes. This implied an income of about 235 
million for the provincial government.
32 As will be seen below, the overexploiting of the 
provincial bank as a source of cheap financing contributed to the collapse of the province in 
1995.  
 
Table 16. Cordoba: Evolution and Composition of Public Debt in Millions of Pesos   
           
199 9 92 3 4 95  9
 
   0 19 1 19 199 199 19 19 6 Jun-97
Consolidated Debt  96. .5 6 .7 .3 .8  1 44 13 .1 444 648 820 931.4 869
Provincial Bank of Cordoba 60. .2 7.3 .3 .4 .3 
0 0 21 .8 9 .7  00
24. 0 3.4 .3 .2 .1 
0 .6 2.5 .6 .6 .7 
0 0000
9.5 .1 7.9 .7 .9 .9 
1 .6 4 9 .1  48
           
      312 .6 .3 
           
96. .5 6 .7 .9 .1
8 8 6 162 400 203 181.2 119.7
Social Bank of Cordoba  34 4 6
Other Banks  8 163 115 119 3.3 72.8
National Government  23 2 32 32 6 6.7 6.7
419  662.4 585
de organismos descentralizados  8 1 42 36 38 29.8 30.8
Special accounts  4 14.2 27 54
 
Floating Debt  320 509 311.4 422.2
 
Total Debt  1 44 13 .1 756 968 1330   1243 1291.2
Notes: (2) Includes advances on federal coparticipation, CECOR emissions under Law 8,482 and Patriotic Solidarity Bonds.
Source: Bolsa de Comercio de Cordoba, based on data from the Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas. 
O t h e r  t y p e s  ( 2 )  
                                                           
32 If this income is not computed the fiscal deficit corresponding to 1993 would have been $400 million instead of 
the reported $167 million. 
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constituted by delays in payments of public sector wages, state pensions and arrears with 
suppliers. When these other sources of (compulsory) financing are added, the debt climbed to 
$1,000 million at the end of 1994. This stock of debt represented practically 100 percent of the 
province’s own revenues (including transfers) for that year.  
   
The Unfolding of the Crisis: The Effect of the Liquidity Crises Caused by the Mexican 
Devaluation 
    
In the context of this very fragile fiscal situation, at the beginning of 1995, the Mexican 
devaluation generated in Argentina a liquidity crisis and one of the most serious bank panics that 
the country has ever experienced. The run on banks particularly affected the provincial 
institutions, as they were perceived to be the least solvent within the financial system. In the case 
of the Banco de Cordoba this perception was correct. The magnitude of the run suffered by the 
bank can be illustrated by the fact that it lost $400 million in deposits between the end of 1994 
and 1995. This crisis in the provincial bank had a significant impact on provincial finances 
during 1995. Not only could the province no longer use its bank as a source of financing, but it 
also had to use provincial fiscal resources in order to prevent the institution’s bankruptcy. It is 
estimated that the provincial treasury had to make an extraordinary contribution of $250 million 
to keep the bank in operation  
Besides the problem with its provincial bank the province had to suffer at the beginning 
of 1995 an important fall in its total revenues coming both from a reduction in both own tax 
revenues and transfers from the federal government. Both factors were a consequence of the 
acute recession that affected the economy at the beginning of 1995. Still the reduction in 
transfers from the federal government was larger compared to other provinces because Cordoba, 
as indicated previously, did not sign the Fiscal Pact of 1992, which assured a lower bound for 
these resources. Thus, while during 1995 the rest of the jurisdictions suffered a 2.8 percent 
decline in federal transfers, Cordoba was hit by an 8 percent reduction.
33 
 As a consequence of these factors the province faced a strong financial restriction since 
the beginning of 1995 entering into a default-type situation as it could not meet its more 
immediate expenditure commitments—in particular, payments to public employees, contractors 
  48and suppliers.  By the middle of 1995 the delay in these obligations reached three months, and 
the social situation was very unstable, with protest and riots gaining momentum  
 
Actions Taken by the Central and Provincial Authorities 
 
Though the province was in a very difficult situation as of the end of 1994, the federal 
government intervened, offering some financial assistance only after July 1995, once the 
incumbent governor stepped down and a new elected administration took the post.
34 Though the 
new administration was from the same party as the former (Radicals), it was more likely to reach 
an agreement with the national authorities. Thus, federal assistance was offered in the context of 
a formal agreement signed between the new provincial authorities and the executive branch of 
the federal government  
Federal emergency assistance consisted of three types of instruments. The first was a $70 
million bridge loan by the Banco de la Nación Argentina. Second, the central government 
pledged to pay Cordoba what it would have received from the guarantee clause in the Federal 
Pact;
35 one year later the province received more than $100 million as a consequence of this 
instrument. Finally, Cordoba received an advance on its coparticipation payments of around $70 
million. 
An important feature that distinguishes this episode from other provincial crises is that in 
the case of Cordoba a rather draconian adjustment in the provincial finances was introduced by 
the new governor
36  (see Dillinger and Webb, 1998). This severe adjustment included the 
elimination of 14,000 jobs, a reduction of the workday to six hours, and a 10 percent wage cut, 
plus the transfer of 1,500 health workers to the municipalities without compensation. These cuts 
reduced the wage bill by $270 million in 1996. In addition, capital spending was cut by 40 
percent. The new authorities met the debt with suppliers and public employees by issuing a bond 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
33  Besides, a percentage of coparticipation income was retained by the central authorities in payments of previous 
loans taken with the baking system. 
34 The critical economic and social situation forced the new administration to take office before the stipulated time. 
35 As a required first step the new administration had to sign the Federal Pact, a move resisted tenaciously by the 
previous administration.  
36 The new authorities requested a technical mission form the World Bank to analyse a public sector reform 
proposal.  The Bank, through the report “Córdoba-Public Sector Assessment: Proposals for Reform,” made 
recommendations to permanently repair provincial finances.  The proposal included the privatization of banks and 
public enterprises, the transfer of the pension system to the National government, joining the Fiscal Pact, and the 
RESCATE of CECOR.  Of these measures, the provincial government only considered joining the Fiscal Pact.  
  49(CECOR).
37 They also used that bond to pay coparticipation transfers to municipalities (100 
percent of municipal coparticipation was paid in CECOR, and the municipalities in turn used 
them to pay public employees’ salaries and other obligations). CECORs could also be used to 
pay taxes at par value or discounted on the secondary market at 80 percent.  
The adjustment was very effective in reverting the important fiscal imbalances of the 
province in a relative short period of time. By the end of 1995, the deficit was reduced by half 
compared to 1994, and in 1996 the province achieved for the first time in many years a fiscal 
surplus (see Table 15). Though relatively successful, the pain that the adjustment inflicted on the 
population would end up having a cost for the party in government. In 1999 and in spite of a 
good administration, the Radical party lost the elections to a Peronist candidate, putting an end to 
a long period of Radical administrations. 
  
Was a Bailout Extended? Was it Significant? 
 
The case of Cordoba is interesting on various grounds. On one hand, there is ex-post intervention 
by the federal government through some short-term instruments (not originally established to 
deal with this issues, like the Banco de la Nación’s loan) to try to easy a very acute fiscal crisis in 
a province. This fiscal crisis was caused, in turn, by very irresponsible fiscal behavior that 
overexposed Cordoba to shocks. This feature makes the episode a clear case of bailout. Still, the 
amount of money involved in the bailout was relatively small. Though the central authorities 
provided some assistance ex-post, the province carried out the majority of the adjustment on its 
own. The total amount of resources received from the center was not that much, especially in 
relation to Cordoba’s size. The province initially received $140 million and, as noted above, the 
debt overhang in mid-July was around $1,000 million. What factors somehow checked the 
federal government’s ex-post incentives to intervene in a more significant way?  
One explanation is that the eventual cost of adjustment, in the absence of major financial 
assistance from the central government, did not have a close correlation in term of political costs. 
In this sense, the fact cannot be ignored that the opposition party led the province, so the federal 
                                                           
37 The issuance of CECOR bonds reached $800 millions. Those bonds had a two-year maturity and 12 percent 
annual yield, and they were available in months 15, 21 and 24. 
  50government did not perceive any important political cost if it failed to help the province in 
problems.
38  
A second explanation that must be stressed is that the federal government at that moment 
had few instruments available to help Cordoba, especially given the amounts of funds required 
and the fact that the National Administration was itself facing a very difficult situation. As is 
well-known, the Mexican devaluation generated in Argentina a very fragile situation in the first 
half of 1995, with a very acute banking crisis. All the efforts of the federal authorities at that 
moment were geared to prevent the banking crisis from becoming a currency panic which could 
forced the government to abandon convertibility.  
Thus both political and inflation-stabilization commitment considerations significantly 
reduced the federal government’s ex-post incentive to intervene on a large scale. It is therefore 
not surprising to find that, faced with this situation, the new provincial administration forced the 
strong adjustment in local finances which was a key ingredient in the solution of the crisis. Thus 
the size of Cordoba, coupled with the very difficult financial situation at the national level, 
limited the amount of financial assistance the government could provide without risking national 
macroeconomic stability. This is true not only of Cordoba, but also of other large provinces such 
as Buenos Aires, La Pampa or Santa Fe. It is not surprising, then, that those jurisdictions were 
not included in the financial rescue operations that had benefited other smaller and poorer 
provinces.   
   
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper concludes with a general assessment regarding the occurrence of bailout episodes 
between different levels of government in Argentina. First of all, it has been possible to identify 
several episodes of bailout in the relationship between provinces and the national government, in 
which jurisdictions were running very unsustainable fiscal policies that at some point brought the 
province to the brink of bankruptcy. The exact time when the province entered into a serious 
fiscal crisis was in some episodes prompted by the occurrence of exogenous shocks in the 
economy, as was the case with the Tequila crisis in 1995. In this regard, the intervention of the 
federal government nationalizing the provincial pension systems and also in the case of Cordoba 
                                                           
38 On the contrary, it may have been surmised that when the population suffered the adjustment it would punish the 
local Radical party (as in fact occurred). 
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provinces. On other occasions, like in the BOTESO episode, the provinces’ fiscal distress was 
associated with an acute political crisis, which in turn motivated financial and political 
intervention by the federal government.  
In general, however, the federal government did not set up extensive and generous rescue 
operations. They were more a case-by-case-type solution. Using these mechanisms and 
negotiations the federal government tried to obtain some benefits (such as provincial adjustment, 
reforms, etc.) in exchange for the financial help it handed out. Even though the central authorities 
showed generosity toward some small and poor jurisdictions (as in BOTESO operations 
involving Corrientes or Santiago del Estero), federal support for other provinces, most notably 
large provinces such as Cordoba, was much less. In the latter instances the province itself bore 
most of the cost of adjustment.  
What were the reasons for this kind of asymmetry? As noted above, the role of political 
variables must be emphasized. For instance, in the case of some small jurisdictions the federal 
government was actually running the province as a result of intervention brought about by local 
fiscal and political crises. Thus any wrongdoing in the management of local affairs was easily 
identified with the federal administration, which in turn could have had negative consequence in 
term of votes. In the case of Cordoba, though, these circumstances did not apply. On the 
contrary, the opposition party was in charge of the province and the local administration pursued 
a policy quite independent of what was being proposed at the national level. Thus it was quite 
clear that the political cost of an eventual crisis was going to be supported mostly by the local 
Radical administration.  
Besides politics, though, it is emphasized that after 1991 the federal government has 
much less room to accommodate provincial deficits (and of course national deficits). By 
establishing a currency board arrangement, the Convertibility Law of March 1991 ended 
inflationary Central Bank financing of public sector deficits. Before this period the federal 
government was able to accommodate the expansion in provincial expenditures through 
inflationary financing, but as of 1991 it could not. In this regard, it is not surprising to find that 
the federal authorities provided extraordinary resources to jurisdiction with serious fiscal 
problems using, basically, loans, most of which were repaid in full (e.g., BOTESO).    
  52The hardening of the central government’s budget constraint resulting from the 
convertibility law might have been expected to reduce provincial governments’ incentives to 
misbehave. In theory, provincial governments would have anticipated that federal authorities 
faced strong restrictions on accommodating provincial fiscal deficits ex-post. The bailout 
evidence presented, though, seems to contradict this prediction.  
These findings, however, must be considered in light of the country’s economic history. 
Before convertibility the evidence on bailouts is “contaminated” by the fact that provincial 
governments (as well as national authorities) always had the option of requesting for inflationary 
financing; financial crisis was thus avoided by the extraordinary resources that inflation could 
assure in the short term. Thus the evidence of bailout and fiscal crisis in some provinces 
described above can be seen as a signal of a new fiscal regime, where if a province deviates from 
responsible fiscal behavior and falls into fiscal distress, there is no automatic response by the 
center coming to the rescue. On the contrary, the solution to the crisis is based, in part, on a 
major adjustment by the involved province.  
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The analysis of this issue and the empirical application to Argentina will be facilitated if we 
consider the following stylized model. Consider an economy with a federal government and N 
local governments. All local governments maximize the utility function of their own 
representative consumer. Representative consumers in all localities have the same preferences 




Local endowments are stochastic. The federal endowment is zero, the sole function of the 
federal government being to redistribute income between localities. The redistribution may serve 
the purpose of both wealth redistribution and risk sharing. 






Aj is provincial output, a random variable 
c is private consumption 
Rj is local government revenues 




Both government levels decide on their tax rates 
Shocks at the provincial level are realized 
  
We assume that both levels of government chose tax rates, but revenues are subject to 
shocks. This assumption is consistent with the way policy is actually chosen, since fiscal 
  54variables are typically decided on parliaments on the basis of tax rates, and very rarely change as 
on the basis of general aggregate conditions. This is the basis of viewing government debt as an 




Where Rj* is chosen by the government and εj is a random shock. Let  Π be the column 
vector of the shocks for all j. We assume, for simplicity, that is Π distributed as a multivariate 
normal with mean µ and variance matrix σ. 
Incidentally, note that private consumption is fully determined by government—local and 
federal—tax rates and the shocks, so the analysis will focus on redistribution and smoothing of 
the public good only.
39    
The optimal solution from the federal government point of view, once tax rates have been 










given the weights θj. As it is standard in these consumption smoothing models, the 




for all i,j and all states of nature s. 
  
  55If we assume that the function H is homothetic, then 
gi(s)= γi,j gj(s) 
 
where γi,j  depends on the θ's and the parameters of the utility function. Thus, total 





Replacing these conditions on the federal government budget constraint 
  
Tj+Σi≠jTi=Tj+Σ i≠j (γi,j(Rj(s)+Tj(s)))=F 
 
where we leave implicit the conditioning on the state. After some manipulations we 
arrive at, 
  








Thus, the transfer to the local government is a linear and increasing function of the 
federal resources, and the sum of all other provinces local resources, while it is a decreasing 
function of own local resources, as it is standard in risk sharing models. 
Note that the theory provides sharp predictions regarding the relationship among the 
parameters of the linear restriction and between them and the implicit Pareto weights. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
39 This modeling choice implies that ex-post, there is no substitution of private and public goods. Alternative 
specifications could provide for the possibility that a local government might choose a lower tax rate to increase 
private consumption in the locality. This issue is not addressed here. 
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